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Bankruptcy
ARTHUR WEITZNER* AND RICHARD RoIsMAN**
The authors summarize the significant differences between
the new Bankruptcy Code, which became effective in 1979, and
the Bankruptcy Act that governed bankruptcies prior to 1979.
They also discuss those features of the new law which preserve
important principles of the old. They first consider the changes
in the bankruptcy court, in its procedures and the powers of its
officers. They then examine the changes in the relationships
between the debtor and the creditors and between the various
creditors. Finally, the authors analyze aspects of the new Code
that affect common commercial activities and are of special in-
terest to the practitioner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The "Bankruptcy Code of 1978," which became effective on
October 1, 1979, is the latest expression of the federal govern-
ment's policy of promoting the uniform and efficient treatment of
the assets of insolvents throughout the United States.1 The Consti-
tution provides that Congress shall have the power to create uni-
* Partner in Fierro & Weitzner, Coral Gables, Florida.
** Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1501 (West 1979) [hereinafter referred
to as the "Code" as distinguished from the Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898)
(repealed 1978) which will be referred to as the "Act"].
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form bankruptcy laws for the nation.2 Congress has given effect to
that clause of the Constitution by providing that the United States
district courts shall have original jurisdiction over matters in bank-
ruptcy and that this jurisdiction is exclusive of that of the states.8
Both the framers of the Constitution and the legislators of the
bankruptcy statutes thought that a continued freedom of com-
merce among the various states requires that the laws of insol-
vency be uniform. This uniformity would ensure that cobblers in
New England, cotton growers in Dixie, and hotel operators in Flor-
ida would have similar reasonable expectations as to the risks of
doing business with those who become insolvent. The nationwide
similarity of expectations about insolvency reinforces the virtual
uniformity of modern corporate law and of commercial law under
the Uniform Commercial Code. Debtors and creditors throughout
the United States can therefore deal in states other than their own
with little fear that unfamiliar law will confuse their legal relation-
ships with each other.
Bankruptcy is a procedure for handling debtors who cannot
meet their obligations. It provides a system for the liquidation of
obligations and the discharge or forgiveness of debts. Since bank-
ruptcies are a symptom of weakness in the economy, they occur
more often in times of recession. In the absence of some orderly
insolvency procedure, business failures during recessions would
usually result in a complete loss for creditors and equity holders.
The dire effects of business collapses have led Congress to try to
soften these blows by passing sections of the bankruptcy statute
allowing for the rehabilitation of debtors under the supervision of
the bankruptcy court rather than for a mere discharge of debts.
An example of such a rehabilitative provision was the Chan-
dler Act,' passed in 1938 in response to the Great Depression.
Chapter XI of the Chandler Act became very popular, used so
widely that virtually all proceedings of a rehabilitative nature were
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 provides Congress with the power "[t]o establish . . .
uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id. Collier
makes the observation that although related to commerce, the Bankruptcy Clause was not
included within the Commerce Clause and that therefore, "it is fair to infer that the drafts-
men did not wish to restrict the bankruptcy grant as they had done the power over com-
merce." 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 .02 (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. See
generally Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226 (1976).
4. See generally Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1973).
5. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). See also Bankruptcy Act
§ 77 (repealed 1978) (railroad reorganizations).
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called "Chapter Elevens."' The new Code has preserved this popu-
lar name; most business rehabilitative cases will now be conducted
pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Chandler
Act's wage earner section, Chapter XIII, has been rewoven into a
new Chapter 13 that includes the rehabilitation of proprietorships
and other small businesses, as well as wage earners.7
This article analyzes the important changes the Bankruptcy
Code has brought to federal insolvency law. Where appropriate,
the authors will compare the new laws with the old, comment on
the policies lying behind the changes, and point out pragmatic con-
siderations for practitioners. The article will cover those sections of
the Code common to all proceedings: jurisdiction, parties, court of-
ficers, case administration, liquidations, discharge, and exemptions
from discharge. In addition, the article will analyze certain mate-
rial developments that particularly affect commercial transactions.
These include the changes in the law of preferential transfers and
the interaction of bankruptcy law with leases. Changes in reorgani-
zation proceedings, however, lie beyond the scope of this article.
II. PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL CHANGES
The bankruptcy reform legislation has resulted in the overhaul
of the judicial apparatus for administering the insolvency law as
well as in substantive changes in that law. This portion of the arti-
cle deals with the revised system of bankruptcy procedure under
the Code.
A. The Bankruptcy Court and Judge
As amended, title 28 of the United States Code now provides
specifically for bankruptcy courts.8 The creation of these new
courts resulted from a compromise between the two Houses of
Congress. The House of Representatives sought the creation of an
independent article III court;" however, the Senate prevailed in
making the bankruptcy court a functionally independent adjunct
of the district court.10 Those who supported the establishment of a
6. This consolidation removes from litigation the issue of the appropriate chapter under
which to proceed. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8
(1979).
7. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (West 1979).
8. 11 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 1979) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1976)).
9. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1978) reprinted in COLLIER (Appen-
dix 2, 15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
10. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976).
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wholly independent court argued that independence would make
bankruptcy courts better able to attract qualified judges and would
provide debtors and creditors an impartial and specialized forum
that would promote the quick and efficient administration of a
bankrupt's estate.1"
There have been significant changes in the role of the court's
primary judicial officer, the bankruptcy judge. Formerly, all cases
upon filing were assigned to a district judge who automatically re-
ferred them to the referee in bankruptcy. 2 In 1973, the title of
referee was changed to that of bankruptcy judge; however, the of-
ficer's duties remained the same.' s Congress now has limited the
bankruptcy judge's functions to the adjudication of issues of law
and fact. Under the prior system, the bankruptcy judge not only
decided disputed legal and factual questions 4 but also was respon-
sible for routine administrative tasks, such as the entry of routine
orders and the supervision of case docketing. 5 Congress believed,
with questionable validity,' 6 that the discharge of detailed admin-
istrative duties by the court gave it an early familiarity with the
facts and issues in a particular case that influenced the court in its
subsequent rulings on issues of fact and law in the same case. The
judge would, for instance, rule on jurisdictional questions both at
the first meeting and later. Congress believed that the influence of
the court's earlier rulings prejudiced those who sought to litigate
against the trustee or debtor. To alleviate this imagined problem,
the Code provides that the judge may not preside at the first meet-
ing of creditors and no longer has administrative duties. 7
Various changes have been made in the appointment process
for bankruptcy judges and in their term of office, to give them
more prestige and independence. Effective April 1, 1984, "[t]he
President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, bankruptcy judges for the several judicial districts."' 8 The
11. See HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.
12. Bankruptcy Act § 22 (repealed 1978); FED. R. BANKR. P. 102. This rule is super-
seded by the Code which provides for the filing of all petitions with the bankruptcy court.
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-304 (West 1979).
13. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1973).
14. Bankruptcy Act § 2 (repealed 1978).
15. Id.
16. Indeed, the Senate would have continued the practice of having the court preside
over the first meeting of creditors. See 124 CONG. Rsc. H11,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
17. 11 U.S.C.A. § 341(c) (West 1979).
18. 28 U.S.C.A. app. § 162 (West 1979). To alleviate concern that this process would
delay the administration of bankrupts' estates, Congress has provided that upon expiration
of his term a bankruptcy judge may continue to perform his duties until a successor is
[Vol. 34:403
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former law gave the district court this power. For the purposes of
attracting more qualified judges, their term of office has been ex-
tended from six to fourteen years19 and their compensation has
been increased.2 0
The Code also modifies the procedure for appeals. Under the
Act, appeals were taken in the first instance to the district judge
initially assigned to the case, and thereafter to the court of appeals
for the appropriate circuit. Although retaining this process,1 the
Code also empowers the circuit court of appeals through its chief
judge to designate panels of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals
from the judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy courts in
that circuit. These panels will consist of three judges other than
the one who decided the matter below. 2 Litigants may appeal




As was true under prior law, the trustee is the legal represen-
tative of the bankrupt's estate and, as such, may sue or be sued.'
The Code imposes upon the trustee many of the same affirmative
duties he formerly had.25 These include the duties to liquidate the
estate and account for the cash received,"' to review the claims
against the estate and object to those he deems improper," to in-
vestigate the affairs of the debtor and oppose a discharge if he
thinks it advisable to do so,' 8 to furnish information concerning
the administration of the estate as the parties in interest request, 9
to operate the business of the debtor when so authorized, and to
named. Id. § 153(a).
19. Id. § 153(a).
20. Id. § 154. Each bankruptcy judge is to receive an annual salary of $50,000 subject to
adjustment under the Federal Salary Act.
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1408 (1976).
22. Id. §§ 160(a), 1482.
23. Id. § 1293(b).
24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 323(b) (West 1979).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 47 (repealed 1978).
26. 11 U.S.C.A. § 704(1), (2) (West 1979). It should be noted that the trustee may,
under the Code, invest the money of the estate so "as [to] yield the maximum reasonable
net return on such money, taking into account the safety of such deposit or investment. Id.
§ 704(2); cf. Bankruptcy Act § 61 (repealed 1978) (requiring that the trustee use designated
banking institutions as depositories for the money of estates).
27. 11 U.S.C.A. § 704(4) (West 1979).
28. Id. § 704(5).
29. Id. § 704(6) (unless the court orders otherwise).
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close the estate through the filing of a final account of administra-
tion with the court.8 0
The creation of the office of interim trustee has buttressed the
authority of the permanent trustee. 81 The Code provides that at
the inception of every case, the judge shall appoint an interim trus-
tee.32 This interim trustee serves until the first meeting of creditors
and thereafter if a new trustee is not elected. 3 The interim trustee
will usually become the permanent trustee. The term "receiver"
has been abolished, and those functions previously performed by
the receiver are now to be performed by the interim trustee.3 4 Con-
gress apparently intends to discourage creditors from selecting
their own trustee for a bankrupt's estate by providing them with
an "interim" trustee, appointed by the judge before the first meet-
ing of creditors and ready to assume the powers and duties of a
permanent trustee. Congress seems to have edged toward shifting
control of the bankruptcy process from the hands of the creditors
to those of the bankruptcy bureaucracy.
The national pilot trustee program, which will operate in cer-
tain judicial districts but not in Florida, is another sign of Con-
gress' intent to bureaucratize the bankruptcy process. 5 Under the
pilot program, to become effective on April 1, 1984, the Attorney
General will appoint a United States trustee.,36 This trustee will
establish a panel of available private trustees but may also serve as
trustee in any specific case.3 7 By January 3, 1984, the Attorney
General shall report to Congress, the President, and the judicial
conference of the United States on the feasibility of the program.
The Attorney General shall submit a recommendation concerning
the advisability of installing the national trustee program on a per-
30. Id. § 704(7), (8). The trustee is required to notify the taxing authorities and make
periodic reports regarding the operation of the business as the court requires. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 604(0 (1976).
32. 11 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (West 1979).
33. Id. § 701(b).
34. Id. § 105(b). "The Bankruptcy Code has ample provision for the appointment of
trustees when needed. Any appointment of a receiver would simply circumvent the estab-
lished procedures." HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 316.
35. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 408(a), 1501 (West 1979) (listing 10 districts designed for the pilot
program).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 581(a) (1976). The United States Trustee is subject to removal for
cause. Id. § 581(c).
37. 11 U.S.C.A. § 586(a)(1), (2) (West 1979). It is contemplated that the administrative
tasks performed under the Act by the bankruptcy judge will now be performed by the
United States Trustee. Id. § 586(a)(3).
[Vol. 34:403
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manent basis throughout the United States."6
The Code provisions for the compensation of trustees further
evidence the intent of Congress to reduce the creditors' control
over the bankruptcy process. The Code greatly reduces the com-
pensation for the permanent trustee and eliminates it for the in-
terim trustee."9 In a period of high inflation, the only rationale for
cutting the trustee's compensation would seem to be the discourag-
ing of private parties from acting as trustees and the dissuasion of
the creditors from electing a private trustee in the face of difficul-
ties in attracting capable and honest people to serve as trustees for
insufficient pay.
Shifting power over the insolvency process to bureaucrats,
however, will make the process slower and less efficient. Further-
more, a bankruptcy bureaucracy has no interest in preserving the
property of creditors. Congress has apparently forgotten that it is
the creditors' money that is involved in bankruptcy proceedings.
C. First Meeting of Creditors
The first meeting of creditors is a procedure in which the cred-
itors can examine the debtor to determine what assets he has and
in which the creditors may elect a permanent trustee. The changes
the Code brings to the first meeting, like the changes the Code
brings to other bankruptcy procedures, weaken the position of the
creditors.
The Code provides that the interim trustee and those credi-
tors present at the first meeting of creditors will examine the
debtor to test the accuracy of his claims." The bankruptcy judge
will no longer preside over the first meeting. This change leaves
open the question of who is to preside. Initially, one might think
that the interim trustee would preside. The interim bankruptcy
rules adopted by the districts, however, provide that a clerk will
preside."' As a lay person, unfamiliar with propositions of law, the
clerk will be unable to rule on objections. The meeting could dis-
integrate into a disorganized free-for-all. The absence of the judge
will itself impede the orderly conduct of the first meeting. The au-
thority his presence under the former procedure lent the first
38. 11 U.S.C.A. § 408(b) (West 1979).
39. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 48c(1) (repealed 1978) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 326(a) (1979).
See Mann, The New Bankruptcy Code-Some'Early Problems and Suggested Solutions, 85
COM..L.J. 17, 18 (1980).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West 1979); HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 331.
41. Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rule 2003(b)(1).
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meeting no doubt had a great psychological impact on the debtor.
His ability to examine the debtor increased the pressure on the
debtor to testify truthfully about his assets and liabilities. This
pressure will now evaporate.
These changes in the first meeting, furthermore, will probably
not accomplish Congress's purpose of avoiding judicial prejudice
through the judge's participation in the first meeting and judicial
cronyism in appointing receivers and trustees. The judge appoints
the interim trustee4 who, in most cases, will become the perma-
nent trustee. It is only natural that the judge will have confidence
in his appointees. Thus, the judge still could be prejudiced by the
recommendations of the trustee in contested matters. It therefore
appears that this new system will not correct the problems that
Congress perceived but will create others. If Congress felt that the
image of bankruptcy procedure needed a renovation, the removal
of the judge from the first meeting of creditors was not the way to
accomplish this cosmetic alteration.
The first meeting of creditors also is the time for the election
of the permanent trustee. In most cases, the interim trustee will
continue on as permanent trustee.4 Unsecured creditors, however,
may vote for a different trustee if they wish. The election of a trus-
tee is valid only if creditors eligible to vote are voting at least
twenty percent of the allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, un-
secured claims entitled to distribution.
5
A creditor may vote only if he holds an "allowable, undis-
puted, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim of a kind entitled to dis-
tribution. . .; does not have an interest materially adverse. . . to
the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution; and is not an
insider.'4 6 Claims are presumed allowed for the purposes of voting,
unless they are insufficient on their face. 1 The prior law required
for election of the trustee a simple majority in the amount of un-
secured claims and the number of unsecured creditors voting at
the meeting of creditors.
42. 11 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (West 1979).
43. Id. § 702(d).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 702(c).
46. Id. § 702(a). The term "materially adverse" is used in FED. R. BANKR. P. 207(d) and
requires the court to consider the nature, size and degree of the adverse interest. HousE
REPORT at 378. An "insider" is a new term defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1979).
47. FED. R. BANKR. P. 207(a); 11 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1979) deems a claim of interest
allowed, absent the objection of a party in interest.
48. Bankruptcy Act § 56(a) (repealed 1978); FED. R. BANKR. P. 207(b).
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The effect of these changes will be to weaken the first meeting
of creditors as an effective means of ensuring creditor control of
the bankruptcy process.
D. Jurisdiction
The Code brings about major changes in the subject matter
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts by abolishing the distinction
between "summary" and "plenary" jurisdiction, a distinction
which dates back over a century.4 In deciding whether summary
or plenary jurisdiction lay, the essential issue formerly turned on
the possession of the property in question. If the litigation in-
volved the determination of rights to property in the possession of
the trustee, then the case lay within the summary and exclusive
jurisdiction of the court.50 On the other hand, a proceeding to de-
termine the rights to property within the possession of a bona fide
claimant adverse to the trustee was plenary in nature. The bank-
ruptcy court lacked power to determine matters within the plenary
jurisdiction, absent the consent of the adverse claimant.51 Accord-
ingly, if the trustee were to assert rights against an adverse claim-
ant he would have to do so in either a state court or a federal
court, as appropriate.52
Although much could be said in favor of this bifurcated juris-
dictional setup,5 this preliminary determination of summary or
plenary jurisdiction was often just something extra to litigate. Fre-
49. Bankrupt Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (superseded 1898); see Lath-
rop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 518 (1875).
50. See White v. Schloerb, 178 U.S. 542 (1900). This exclusive jurisdiction extended to
proceedings to determine the rights of parties holding liens obtained through legal or equi-
table proceedings within four months of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 23b (repealed 1978).
51. Id. If an adverse claim is real and substantial in that it "discloses a contested mat-
ter of right, involving some fair doubt and reasonable room for controversy, . . . in matters
either of fact or law," then the bankruptcy court must decline to determine the merits of the
case and the trustee must resort to a plenary suit. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191
(1926); Bel Marin Keys Community Servs. Dist. v. Lines, 18 C.B.C. 199 (9th Cir. 1978).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 23b (repealed 1978); see In re Norsesian, 16 C.B.C. 527 (M.D.
Fla. 1977) (mere filing of a claim in the absence of a Bankruptcy Act § 57g counterclaim or a
controversy with regard to whether a claim should be allowed is not consent to summary
jurisdiction by the claimant); cf. In re Rondon, No. 75-B-1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (filing proof
of a claim in an adversary proceeding by a trustee asserting a fraudulent conveyance is
consent to summary jurisdiction as to the existence of the fraudulent transfer); In re Beh-
ring and Behring, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (where it is
necessary to consider a counterclaim in order to allow or disallow a claim, the counterclaim
is within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court).
53. It can be said that the system enables state courts to resolve issues of state property
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quently, a virtual trial on the merits was needed to determine if
the adverse claimant was subject to the summary jurisdiction of
the court. 4 This inefficient situation led to reform legislation. Con-
gress found it necessary to eliminate the "serious delays, expense
and duplications associated with the. . . dichotomy between sum-
mary and plenary jurisdiction, a wasteful remnant of the referee
system left over from the pre-Chandler Act era.""'
The abolition of the distinction between summary and plenary
jurisdiction expands the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. All
matters involving the liquidation of the bankrupt's estate are to be
tried in the bankruptcy court and before the bankruptcy judge.
The bankruptcy court also has jurisdiction over all property of the
debtor, anywhere in the United States, as of the commencement of
the case. 7 The court may abstain in the interest of justice from
hearing a particular proceeding; this decision to abstain is not re-
viewable by appeal or otherwise." As an example, if a few creditors
brought an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding in a judicial district
across the country from the districts in which the bulk of the
bankrupt's creditors resided and did business, the bankruptcy
court might abstain from taking jurisdiction. Cases of abstention
will probably be rare. The parties will usually try all issues in the
bankruptcy court.
E. The Course of Bankruptcy Proceedings
There are two ways to begin bankruptcy proceedings under
the Code. The debtor may file a voluntary petition" on his own
behalf. Against it, the creditors of an insolvent debtor may file an
involuntary petition." These same two methods existed under the
Bankruptcy Act. 1 The Code makes greater changes in the require-
ments for an involuntary petition than in those for a voluntary
54. See, e.g., In re Naviera Azta, S.A., 500 F.2d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Abraham,
421 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 17 (1978), reprinted in [19791 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5803.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976).
57. Id. § 1471(e).
58. Id. § 1471(d). Note that the bankruptcy court after notice and a hearing may dis-
miss a case (total abstention) or suspend proceedings under the Code if the interests of
creditors and the debtor would be better served by such action. 11 U.S.C.A. § 305 (West
1979).
59. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1979).
60. Id. § 303.




The technical requirements for becoming an involuntary
debtor resemble those under the prior law."' So do the require-
ments for becoming a creditor petitioner to an involuntary peti-
tion."3 Certain entities such as farmers, 4 including corporate farm-
ers, e6 and corporations that are neither moneyed, business, nor
commercial companies, may not become involuntary debtors.
Banks and insurance companies fall into the class of corporations
which cannot become involuntary debtors.6 At least three credi-
tors must join in the involuntary petition unless there are fewer
than twelve creditors altogether. The jurisdictional amount for
the creditor claims has been increased from $500.00 to $5,000.00.68
An involuntary proceeding commences with the filing of the
petition. The petition must set forth the names and addresses of
the petitioners, the name of the debtor, a statement of venue and
jurisdiction, and allegations of grounds for an "order for relief.""
If the debtor chooses to contest the petition, he may file an an-
swer.70 If he fails to file a timely answer, the court may enter an
order for relief at once. 1 If the debtor does answer, the court shall
conduct a trial and enter an order for relief if the petitioners prove
their allegations.72 The court may, upon an application by a party
in interest, appoint an interim trustee while the trial is pending.
73
If a party moves the court to require the petitioners to post a
62. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West 1979).
63. Id. § 303(b)(1), (2).
64. Id. § 101(17). This definition of "farmer" is not limited to an "individual."
65. See id. § 101(30) (definition of "person" includes a corporation).
66. Id. § 303(a).
67. Id. § 303(b)(1), (2).
68. Id. Note that this increase-in jurisdictional amount applies to both liquidation pro-
ceedings and reorganizations under Chapter 11. This is to eliminate an "artificial difference
between the two chapters that would provide an incentive for one or the other." Hous.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 322.
69. FED. R. BANKR. P. 104 has been superseded by the Code which has abolished acts of
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 1979). Therefore, use suggested Interim Form No.
9 until such time as new rules and forms are promulgated or the courts or Congress adopts
the interim forms.
70. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(d) (West 1979).
71. Id. § 303(h).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 303(g). The appointment of an interim trustee may occur only after notice to
the debtor and a hearing. There must be a showing that the appointment is "necessary to
preserve the property of the estate or to prevent loss to the estate." Id. The trustee, pursu-
ant to id. § 704, may take possession of the property of the estate and operate the business
of the debtor. The debtor, however, may regain possession of this property if he files a bond
as the court requires. Id. § 303(g).
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bond, the court may so require after a preliminary hearing on the
merits.7 '
The Code relaxes the burden of proof of the petitioners in an
involuntary proceeding by diminishing the number and specificity
of the elements they must establish to obtain an order for relief.
The Act required the petitioning creditors to prove two things:
that the alleged bankrupt was insolvent, and that the alleged
bankrupt had committed one of the six enumerated acts of bank-
ruptcy.75 Under the Code, these old elements, sometimes difficult
to prove, have been eliminated. The petitioners now need prove
only one of the following two propositions: that the debtor is gen-
erally not paying his obligations as they become due," or that,
within 120 days before the filing of the petition, a custodian other
than a trustee, receiver, or other agent was authorized to take
charge of less than substantially all the property of the debtor for
the purpose of enforcing a lien against that property." The need to
prove insolvency under the legal standard has been eliminated.
The legal standard has been replaced by an approximation of the
equitable test of insolvency: whether the debtor is unable to meet
its obligations as they fall due. 8 Probably, the first ground will be
the one most often employed by petitioning creditors, as the one
that more closely comports with reason and the general conception
of when a person is insolvent. All complicated proofs concerning
balance sheets, appraisal of remote or contingent assets, and the
prior discovery of some mystical act of bankruptcy have been
obviated.
If the involuntary petition is timely controverted, the petition-
ers must prove at trial one of the two aforementioned grounds for
an order for relief.L79 Most petitions probably will be brought upon
allegations that the debtor is generally not paying its obligations as
they fall due. It remains to be seen how liberally the courts will
construe the term "generally not paying its obligations."80 One
may hope for a liberal construction to protect petitioning creditors
74. Id. § 303(e).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 3a (repealed 1978).
76. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h)(1) (West 1979).
77. Id. § 303(h)(2).
78. See note 80 infra.
79. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h) (West 1979).
80. There is arguably a distinction between this test and the so-called "equity insol-
vency test." Compare id. § 303(h)(1) with Bankruptcy Act § 77(a)-which provides:-"Any
railroad corporation may file a petition stating that it is insolvent or unable to meet its
debts as they mature . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
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by enabling them to carry their burden if they prove that they are
not being paid and that their claims are bona fide and past due. A
close reading of the second ground for an order for relief 1 reveals
that Congress intends to eliminate unnecessary litigation over real
estate foreclosures in which a custodian takes charge of almost all
of the property of the debtor. In most cases in which this occurs,
the debtor will not be paying its obligations as they fall due. The
outraged creditors will therefore still have a way of getting into
bankruptcy court.
The requirements for a voluntary dismissal of the proceeding
82
are the same as they were under the prior law.88 Petitioners may
dismiss voluntarily after notice to all of the creditors and in the
following circumstances: upon motion of the petitioner; upon con-
sent of all petitioners and debtors; or for want of prosecution.' A
voluntary dismissal, including one for want of prosecution, is with-
out prejudice to the petitioners' right to refile.88
Petitioners may use a voluntary dismissal to save themselves
the costs of further litigation after the commencement of the invol-
untary proceeding effects the result they desire, the payment or
composition of their claims by the debtor. Creditors used to file
involuntary petitions as a drastic last measure to secure payment
of the compromise of claims from an obstinate debtor who believed
that he could stall payment through lengthy state court proceed-
ings. The barriers that the required elements of proof set before a
creditor who sought to use an involuntary petition discouraged the
use of this effective collection device. By relaxing the creditors'
burdens of proof, the Code encourages the use of involuntary peti-
tions. There may be numerous filings of such petitions as creditors
and their attorneys become increasingly familiar with this new
tool. One should note, however, the provision of the Code that if
petitioning creditors cannot prove their case at the time of trial,
the court may tax petitioners with the debtor's costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees. 81 If an interim trustee has taken posses-
81. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h)(2) (West 1979). Note the broad and descriptive Code defini-
tion of "custodian." Id. § 101(10).
82. Id. § 303(j).
83. Bankruptcy Act § 59g (repealed 1978).
84. 11 U.S.C.A. § 3030) (West 1979); FED. R. BANKR. P. 120; see 11 U.S.C. § 349 (effect
of dismissal). The rationale for the requirement of notice to all of the creditors is that it
prevents collusive settlements among the debtor and the petitioning creditors to the exclu-
sion and prejudice of nonparticipating creditors. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9,_at 324.
85. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 324.
86. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(i)(1) (West 1979).
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sion of the debtor's properties, the court may award a prevailing
debtor the damages proximately caused by the filing of the invol-
untary petition. If the petitioners filed in bad faith, the court may
award the debtor punitive damages.87 These stringent penalties for
the unsuccessful commencement of an involuntary proceeding are
really no different from the potential damages in a malicious pros-
ecution action. They should serve as no deterrent to the bona fide
petitioners.
Although the insolvency of an account debtor remains the
number one nightmare of creditors, the procedural changes im-
posed by the Code permit the diligent creditor to rescue the assets
for the creditors before the debtor has the opportunity to dissipate
them. The lessened difficulty for creditors in winning an order for
relief after filing an involuntary petition helps to counterbalance
the decreased power the creditors have over the course of the
proceedings.
F. Automatic Stay
No discussion of bankruptcy can be complete without mention
of the automatic stay.88 The stay is a form of injunctive relief af-
forded as a matter of right to debtors in bankruptcy. It is unique
to this system.
In the enforcement of obligations, whether secured or un-
secured, all actions are automatically stayed as of the filing of the
petition.89 The Code lists the types of actions which are stayed and
the types which are not.'0 The purpose of the stay is to enable the
debtor to have all of his claims determined by the bankruptcy
court in order to relieve the debtor from harrassment and the con-
sequent frustration of his rehabilitation or equitable liquidation.
The most important modification in the provision for stays
under the new law is the imposition of time limits on the court in
87. Id. § 303(i)(2).
88. Id. § 362.
89. Compare Bankruptcy Act § lla (repealed 1978) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 401(a) (suits
founded upon claims from which a discharge would be a complete release are enjoined until
adjudication or dismissal of the petition) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1979). Note also
that under the Bankruptcy Act the bankruptcy court was authorized to enjoin any creditor
at any time, whether his claim was dischargeable or not, from instituting or continuing an
action on any debt. Bankruptcy Act § 17c(4) (repealed 1978).
90. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a), (b) (West 1979). The exceptions to the application of the au-
tomatic stay are set out in subsection (b). These actions, however, are not immune from
injunction. See id. § 105; 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976) (bankruptcy court given powers of courts
of law, equity and admiralty); HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 342.
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ruling on a motion to dissolve a stay. The Code specifies that thirty
days after a request for relief from the stay has been made, the
stay ends unless the court after notice and a hearing orders the
stay continued.91 This hearing may be a preliminary hearing or a
final determination. If it is preliminary, a final hearing must com-
mence within thirty days after the preliminary ruling. 2
Other departures from the Act are the inclusion of creditor
setoffs and proceedings before the tax court within the class of
stayed actions."
The grounds for dissolving an automatic stay include the lack
of adequate protection for the property interest of a petitioning
creditor, the debtor's lack of equity in property in which the credi-
tor has an interest, and the property's not being necessary for a
reorganization. The grant of relief can terminate, modify, or con-
dition the stay.95
III. THE RELATIONSHIPS, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES
OF THE PARTIES TO A BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING
A. The Debtor
The Code provides that any natural person or corporation re-
siding, domiciled, or holding property in the United States may file
a voluntary petition pursuant to Chapter 7.96 The entity, however,
may not be a railroad, insurance company, bank, or savings and
loan association. A municipality may be a debtor under Chapter
9.98
Under the Code, the individual may file a petition for a liqui-
dation proceeding to obtain a discharge. A discharge is a cancella-
tion of all debts-a theoretical fresh start in life. For corporations,
91. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(e) (West 1979).
92. Id. If it holds a preliminary hearing, the court shall continue the stay if there is a
reasonable probability that the debtor will prevail at the final hearing. Id. § 362(e)(1), (2).
Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rule 4001 provides a thirty day deadline within which
time the court must conclude a final hearing. Also, a procedure is suggested for obtaining ex
parte relief available under 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(f) (West 1979).
93. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(7), (8) (West 1979).
94. Id. § 362(d).
95. Id. Although the movant has the burden of proof with regard to the debtor's equity
in the property, the debtor has the burden of proof on all other issues. Id. § 362(g).
96. Id. § 109(a); see In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
97. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b) (West 1979).
A railroad may be a debtor, however, under Chapter 11. See id. § 109(d); Bankruptcy
Act § 77 (repealed 1978).
98. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c) (West 1979).
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which have no true existence after the filing of the petition for liq-
uidation, the proceeding simply marshalls assets for distribution to
creditors, since corporations may no longer obtain a discharge.99
There have also been changes in the rules concerning dis-
charge for natural persons. Before the Code was passed, a debtor
who issued a false written financial statement in conjunction with
the obtaining of credit for a business could be denied a discharge
from all debts of the business. 10 0 This exception to discharge has
been under attack for the last forty years in both the legislature
and the courts. The Code eliminates it.10 Although the debtor en-
titled to a discharge is supposed to be an "honest" debtor, Con-
gress has decided that the publication of a materially false
financial statement is not so serious a transgression as to bar dis-
charge altogether. 02 The creditor who relies upon this false state-
ment when extending credit to the debtor, however, may petition
the court to have his obligation exempted from the order of
discharge. 08
Under the new law, but not under the old, the debtor must
appear at a hearing where he is informed of his discharge and its
effect. 10 4 The court, at that time, will caution the debtor about the
reaffirmation of debts. 05 If the debt is a consumer obligation, a
reaffirmation by the debtor would not be binding unless approved
by the court. The court must find that the reaffirmation agreement
does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor, is in the best interest of the debtor, or is entered
into in good faith and in settlement of litigation.'" If the debt is
not a consumer obligation, the court will inform the debtor that he
has no duty to reaffirm any debts and will explain the effects of a
99. Under prior law, the debts of partnerships and corporations could be discharged.
Compare id. § 727(a)(1) with Bankruptcy Act § 14c (repealed 1978).
100. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(3) (repealed 1978).
101. For example, in 1960, Congress limited the objection to a discharge of all debts to
instances of reliance upon materially false financial statements made by businessmen. Pub.
L. No. 86-621, 74 Stat. 408 (1960) (amending Bankruptcy Act § 14c) (repealed 1978). Of
course, the more sophisticated creditor sought an exception for his claim and merely
threatened the use of Bankruptcy Act § 14c(3). See note 104 infra. See generally 1 D. Cow-
ANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 111 (2d ed. 1978).
102. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 1979). See generally Zaretsky, The Fraud Exception
to Discharge Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (1979).
103. 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(a)(2)(B) (West 1979); Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2) (repealed 1978).
104. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 521(4), 524(d) (West 1979).
105. Id. § 524(d).




The Code's protection of the debtor from governmental dis-
crimination on account of the discharge reinforces the fresh start
the discharge gives the debtor. The Code provides that no govern-
mental unit may
deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, char-
ter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant,
to discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny em-
ployment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, a person that is or has been a
debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or
debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or
debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the
commencement of the case under this title, or during the case
but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has
not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title
or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.108
This section is a codification of prior federal case law. It eliminates
all doubt concerning the legislature's intention of affording the
debtor a fresh start. It has been a practice of various state licensing
boards in the areas of motorist responsibility and construction con-
tracting to suspend the driver's license or building license of par-
ties who file in bankruptcy if the debtor seeks a discharge either of
uninsured motorist claims or of debts arising out of construction
activities. In overruling such state action, Congress is stating that
its laws concerning bankruptcy shall remain the supreme law of
the land.109
The duties of the debtor now are basically the same as they
were under prior law.110 The debtor must file a list of creditors, a
schedule of assets and liabilities, and a statement of his financial
affairs,' cooperate with the trustee," 2 turn over to the trustee all
107. Id. § 524(d)(1)(A).
108. Id. § 525 (protection against discriminatory treatment) (codifying Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (provision in Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
which suspended driving privileges for nonpayment of judgments arising out of automobile
accident lawsuits, even after a discharge to the judgment debtor, held in direct conflict with
Bankruptcy Act § 17 and thus violative of the supremacy clause)).
109. Id.
110. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 7 with 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 1979) and FED. R.
BANKR. P. 108, 109, 402.
111. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(1) (West 1979).
112. Id. § 521(2).
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property of the estate and any recorded information relating to the
estate," ' and attend the new hearings concerning discharge' 1 4 and
the first meeting of creditors."1 5
B. The Creditors
As under prior law,1 6 the Code classifies creditors (the persons
holding claims against the debtor) as either unsecured, secured, or
priority creditors.' 7 Under the Code, unsecured creditors continue
to be those claimants who extended credit to the debtor under nor-
mal credit terms and are usually trade creditors or unsecured lend-
ers. The Code makes only changes in wording in this area. 1 8 But
the Code substantially modifies the law on secured and priority
creditors.
The Code allows a secured creditor a secured claim only for
the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim as to the balance
of the debtor's obligation." 9 The purpose of this provision is to
prohibit arbitrariness on the part of secured lenders. Examples of
such arbitrariness occurred often under the Act in consumer bank-
ruptcies and in cases where the debtor's major asset was real es-
tate. When multiple creditors had mortgages on the same piece of
real estate, the third, fourth, or later mortgages would probably
have no real value, since their claims would always face possible
preemption by the prior mortgages. Under the Act, even these
third or fourth mortgagees would be all but immune from the
bankruptcy process. They would have, in effect, a veto power over
any reorganization plan. 20 Under the Code, the bankruptcy court
can take into account the valuelessness of these subordinate claims
by treating subordinate mortgagees as unsecured creditors to the
extent of most of their claims. Also, reorganizations may now take
place without the consent of the subordinate mortgagees.
In consumer bankruptcies, the Code has provided the individ-
ual debtor the right to redeem certain encumbered property by
paying to the holder of the security interest an amount equal to
113. Id. § 521(3).
114. Id. §§ 521(4), 524(d).
115. Id. § 343.
116. See Bankruptcy Act § 57h (repealed 1978); FED. R. BANKR. P. 306(d).
117. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 724, 726, 507 (West 1979).
118. Id. § 506 (abolishing the use of the term "creditor" in this context and substituting
the term "claim"); see FED. R. BANKR. P. 306(d).
119. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West 1979).
120. See Bankruptcy Act § 356 (repealed 1978).
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the value of the collateral. 21 The debtor may do this for "exempt
property" that by its nature does not form part of the estate avail-
able for distribution to creditors, if the security interest is not pos-
sessory and not a purchase money security interest.12 Redemption
by paying the secured creditor only the value of the collateral is
also possible when the trustee has abandoned the property and
thereby removed it from the bankruptcy estate. 2 s Formerly, se-
cured creditors would hound the consumer debtor. Small loan com-
panies might threaten to replevy the household goods that had
been pledged unless the note was reaffirmed or the obligation oth-
erwise compromised. The bankrupt was at the mercy of the se-
cured creditor. Under the Code, however, the court will be the final
arbiter of the value of the collateral and will afford the debtor the
opportunity for complete relief within the bankruptcy proceeding.
The debtor will be able to preserve enough of his assets to assure
him of being able to start a new life.
These changes are crucial to practitioners representing any
party to a security agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding. For the
practitioner representing the debtor, it is essential that the liens on
the underlying collateral be set forth with specificity and that an
accurate valuation be placed upon the collateral in the debtor's pe-
tition to enable prompt and efficient adjustment of the claim by
the court as necessary. Of course, the temptation may be great for
the bankrupt to "steal back" the collateral for a low price; how-
ever, the secured creditors have the right to challenge the debtor's
valuation.1 2 Another check on the debtor is that if the extension of
credit has been induced with a false financial statement a false val-
uation by the debtor could prevent the discharge of the debtor's
obligation to the secured creditor he tried to cheat. While repre-
senting the secured party, practitioners should make sure that the
debtor's valuations are realistic and, if they are, recommend a set-
tlement based upon them. This precaution will cost the creditor
121. 11 U.S.C.A. § 722 (West 1979).
122. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(2) (West 1979).
123. Id. Property that is of Inconsequential value to the estate may be abandoned by
the trustee after notice and a hearing or the trustee may be compelled to abandon such
property upon request of a party in interest. Id. § 554(a), (b). Fully encumbered consumer
goods are of no value to the estate; therefore, a consumer debtor can file a creditor claim, id.
§ 501(c), cause a determination of the amount by which the claim is secured, id. § 506(a),
and pay or possibly refinance the amount of the current value of the collateral, id. § 722.
See generally Lacy, South Carolina's Statutory Exemptions and Consumer Bankruptcy, 30
S.C. L. REv. 643, 673-87 (1979).
124. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979).
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less than would repossession and resale of the collateral. If both
parties are aware of their rights and duties in light of the revised
Code, a swift adjustment of all debts, both secured and unsecured,
may be achieved through an insolvency proceeding. As officers of
the court, practitioners have a duty to attempt to bring about this
result.
C. Priority Claimants
Throughout the history of bankruptcy legislation, Congress
has- sought to single out certain classes of claimants for priority
treatment in the distribution of a debtor's assets. As ever, the first
priority is afforded to those claimants who have incurred "actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including
wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the com-
mencement of the case, and any taxes on, measured by, or with-
held from such wages, salaries, or commissions are allowable as ad-
ministrative expenses." 1 5 Included in this category are the fees of
the trustee and other officers of the court.12 A "super" priority
within the class of first priority administrative claims is afforded
creditors who extend unsecured credit to the trustee authorized to
operate the business of the debtor and thus to incur an unsecured
debt in the ordinary course of business.1 7 Also, some creditors are
entitled to a special priority known as "adequate protection," ei-
ther because a court-ordered stay of other proceedings is damaging
their property interests or because they hold interests in property
subject to use, sale, or lease by the trustee. These claimants may
have their claims satisfied before all other administrative claims if
125. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 355. The priorities section is 11 U.S.C.A. § 507
(West 1979), referring to "administrative claims allowable under section 503(b)." Id. §
507(a)(1). Distribution of the property of the estate is controlled by id. § 726, subject to id.
§ 510, which relates to subordination agreements and equitable subordination. This latter
section codifies existing case law. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). "In the exercise
of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has the power to shift the circumstances
surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the
bankrupt estate." Id. at 307-08.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized three conditions which must be satisfied prior to the
exercise of the power of equitable subordination: "(i) The claimant must have engaged in
some type of inequitable conduct. (ii) The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the
creditors or an unfair advantage on the claimant. (iii) Equitable subordination of the claim
must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." [citations omitted]. In
re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977) (equitable considerations can
justify only the subordination of claims, not their disallowance); see Herzog & Zweibel, The
Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 86 (1961).
126. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b)(1)(A) (West 1979).
127. Id. § 507(b).
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they do not receive such protection. 128
The second priority is for the claimant who extended credit to
the debtor after the filing of an involuntary petition and before the
entry of an order for relief: the so-called "involuntary gap" credi-
tor.129 Because the Code authorizes the debtor to continue in the
operation of his business or his financial affairs as if the petition
had not been filed pending trial on the involuntary petition, °30
creditors may continue to extend credit to the debtor and will then
need priority protection to deal with the debtor with an assurance
that their claims probably will be paid. Although the claim of the
involuntary gap creditor was provable under the Act,' he was
treated as an unsecured, nonpriority claimant. In light of the in-
creased incentives under the Code for the filing of an involuntary
petition, this change is a welcome one.
The next priority class is that of claimants "for wages, salaries,
or commissions, including vacation, severance and sick leave
pay-(a) earned by an individual within 90 days before the filing of
the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business,
whichever occurs first; but only to the extent of $2,000.00 for each
such individual."'3 ,2 There are several changes here. The amount
allowed for this priority claim has been increased. 33 Although the
Act had required that the wages had to have been earned within
three months of the commencement of the proceedings, ' the
128. Id. "Adequate protection," id. § 361, may be required of the trustee or the debtor
in possession after notice and a hearing to insure that the secured creditor will receive the
benefit of his bargain and that the co-owner of property with the debtor will not be
prejudiced in his property interests by the latter's financial problems. The Code illustrates
three means of providing adequate protection: (1) the making of periodic cash payments to
offset any decrease in the value of a creditor or co-owner's interest that has resulted from
the operation of the automatic stay provision, id. § 362, the use, sale or lease of the property
pursuant to id. § 363, or the grant of a lien under id. § 364; (2) providing an additional lien
or replacement lien to compensate for a decrease in value resulting from an automatic stay;
and (3) the granting of such other relief, other than the allowance of a claim as an adminis-
trative expense, as will result in the realization by the co-owner or secured creditor of the
indubitable equivalent of that party's interest in the property, the value of which was de-
creased by the stay. Id. § 361.
This provision is derived from In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971), a case
in which a Chapter X petition was permitted upon a finding that the trustees would be able
to pay the "economic depreciation" on the secured equipment (trucks and tractor-trailers)
so as to preserve the status quo for the secured creditors. Id. at 369.
129. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507(a)(2), 502(0 (West 1979).
130. Id. § 303(f).
131. Bankruptcy Act § 63b (repealed 1978).
132. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(4) (West 1979) (emphasis added).
133. See Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2) (repealed 1978).
134. Id.
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Code dates the critical period from the cessation of the debtor's
business and thereby protects the wage claimant from a nonpri-
ority status when the business ceases and a petition is not readily
filed. The inclusion of vacation, severance and sick pay, and other
fringe benefits with wages "recognizes the realities of labor con-
tract negotiations, under which wage demands are often reduced if
adequate fringe benefits are substituted."1"8
The fourth category of priority claims is new. It consists of
contributions made by a bankrupt employer to employee benefits
plans. 186 This section overrules United States v. Embassy Restau-
rant,1 3 7 which held such contributions outside the Act's definition
of "wages. . . due to workmen."13 8 The new provision allows prior-
ity for a claim of contributions arising from services rendered
within 180 days of the cessation of the business or the commence-
ment of the proceeding, whichever occurs first. The claim must not
exceed an amount equal to $2,000 for each employee covered by
the plan, less the aggregate amount the employees are entitled to
recover under the priorities for wage claims and other employee
benefit plans.19
Another new category of priority claimants is that of deposits,
lay-away plans, security deposits on leases, and advanced pay-
ments for purchases of personal, family, or household goods and
services not yet delivered or provided. An individual must have
made the payments, and the priority is limited to a claim not ex-
ceeding $900.1'0 As the House report makes apparent, consumers
have encountered grave problems in connection with bankrupt re-
tailers and providers of service:
A consumer that pays money in a lay-away plan or as a deposit
on merchandise, or that buys a service contract or a contract for
lessons or a gym membership, is a general unsecured creditor of
the business to which he has given his money. Very few consum-
ers are aware of their status as general unsecured creditors. If
the merchant ... files under the bankruptcy laws, the consumer
is usually left holding the bag. Though he assumed his deposit
was tantamount to a trust fund, he gets nothing from the estate
of the debtor, because the assets available provide little return
to unsecured creditors. Because of his ignorance and his inabil-
135. HousH REPORT, supra note 9, at 357.
136. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(4) (West 1979).
137. 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
138. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2) (repealed 1978).
139. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(4) (West 1979).
140. Id. § 507(a)(5).
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ity to bargain with a retail merchant, he is unable to do a credit
investigation or obtain special terms from the merchant, as a
true creditor may do."1
The sixth priority is afforded to various tax claims." 2 Basi-
cally, a governmental unit is afforded priority treatment for pre-
petition taxes. Taxes incurred by the bankruptcy estate will be
given first priority treatment as priority administrative expenses. 4
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE ON
COMMON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
A. Preferences
The policy of the bankruptcy laws is to provide for the equita-
ble distribution of the unencumbered assets of a financially embar-
rassed debtor. It is therefore desirable to discourage creditors from
"racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide
into bankruptcy."1 44 The Code, even more than the Act, discour-
ages the '"race of diligence" and thereby promotes the policy of eq-
uitable distribution by granting to the trustee greater power to
avoid certain transfers made to or for the benefit of creditors
shortly before bankruptcy. These transfers are known as "prefer-
ences." Property recovered when the trustee avoids a preference is
preserved for all of the creditors of the debtor, not merely those
who have been diligent in obtaining judicial liens or have otherwise
pressured the debtor into giving them preferential treatment.
A preferential transfer has five elements, all of which must be
present for the trustee to have the power of avoidance.
First, a preference requires that there has been a transfer of
property "to or for the benefit of the creditor.' ' 45 The term "trans-
fer" is broadly defined in the Code to include "every mode, direct
or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in prop-
erty including retention of title as a security interest."'4 6 In addi-
141. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 188.
142. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(6) (West 1979).
143. See generally 3 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 507.04[5]; Webster, Tax Aspects of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 10 TAX ADVISER 220, 223 (1979).
144. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 177.
145. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(1) (West 1979).
146. Id. § 101(40). The definition of a "transfer," as broad as it is, does not encompass
a setoff. This reflects the intent of the legislature that the avoidance of a setoff is to be
governed by id. § 553 and not by id. § 547. See 124 CONG. RE c. H11,090 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978). See generally Clark, Preferences Under the Old and New Bankruptcy Acts, 12
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tion, the Code expands the definition of a "creditor" to include the
holders of any pre-petition claims and holders of certain claims
deemed to arise prior to the petition.147 This expanded definition
is consistent with the Code's abolition of the concept of "provabil-
ity" and with the addition to the definition of "claim" to include
"any right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, un-
matured, disputed, undisputed, legal, secured or unsecured
. ... "148 These changes make it possible for all sorts of transfers
by the debtor to virtually all types of creditors to be avoided under
the new preference section, if meeting the other requirements for a
preference. ' 9 The property transferred, however, must be nonex-
empt property, which would be available for distribution to all
creditors. 150
The second element of a preference is that the transfer be "for
or on account of an antecedent debt." ' 1 A preference requires this
element because only the payment of an antecedent debt will de-
plete the assets of the debtor available for distribution and thereby
prejudice other creditors. The pre-existing obligation of the debtor
to pay the transferee creates consideration for the transfer. The
transfer is thus distinct from a fraudulent conveyance, for which
there is inadequate consideration.
152
Third, a preference requires the transfer to have been made
while the debtor was insolvent.158 The Code eliminates the require-
ment of the Act that the transferee have had a reasonable belief
U.C.C. L.J. 154, 166 (1979).
147. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 1(11) (repealed 1978) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(9) (West
1979).
148. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(4)(A) (West 1979). The definition also includes an equitable
remedy for breach of performance if the breach gives rise to a right to payment. See id. §
101(4)(B); HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 309.
149. 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 547.17; see, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 67a (repealed
1978) (invalidating judicial liens).
150. In re Smith, 366 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Idaho 1973) (transfer of validly exempted prop-
erty not a voidable preference) (equity in homestead); see In re Hausman, 209 F. Supp. 219
(M.D. Ga. 1962) (life insurance policy).
151. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(2) (West 1979). There is a codified exception to this require-
ment for those transactions intended by the parties to be a contemporaneous exchange al-
though technically on account of an antecedent debt. Id. § 547(c)(1); see note 176 and ac-
companying text infra.
152. See Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1912). Fraudulent
conveyances are dealt with in the code at 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 1979) (derived from
Bankruptcy Act § 67d (repealed 1978)). See generally 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, at V 548.01.
153. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(3) (West 1979).
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that the debtor was insolvent, often a source of litigation.154 Fur-
thermore, the Code includes a presumption of the debtor's insol-
vency "on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date
of the filing of the petition."1'"
The fourth requirement is that the preferential transfer occur
on or within ninety days before the filing of the petition.1 56 The
Act allowed the avoidance of transfers made within four months
before filing.1 57 The Code also differs from the Act on this require-
ment by creating a special rule for an "insider,"158 more closely
scrutinizing the conduct of one "who has a sufficiently close rela-
tionship with the debtor" (e.g., as a relative or partner, or an of-
ficer of a corporate debtor) than that of creditors who have dealt at
154. Compare id. with Bankruptcy Act § 60b (repealed 1978). The HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 9, succinctly states the reason for the deletion of the reasonable belief
,requirement:
Whether or not a creditor knows or believes that his debtor is sliding into bank-
ruptcy is important if the only purpose of the preference section is to deter the
race. However, a creditor's state of mind has nothing whatsoever to do with the
policy of equality of distribution, and whether or not he knows of the debtor's
insolvency does little to comfort other creditors similarly situated who will re-
ceive that much less from the debtor's estate as a result of the prebankruptcy
transfer to the preferred creditor. To argue that the creditor's state of mind is an
important element of a preference and that creditors should not be required to
disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bank-
ruptcy policy of equality among creditors. Finally, the requirement that the trus-
tee prove the state of mind of his opponent is nearly insurmountable, and
defeats many preference actions.
HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 178.
155. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(f) (West 1979). The Code directs the application of FED. R.
EvID. 301, which places upon the creditor the burden of production of evidence to rebut the
presumption without shifting the burden of proof from the trustee. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252
(West 1979).
156. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(A) (West 1979).
157. Bankruptcy Act § 60a (repealed 1978). The change from a computation based on
the calendar month to one based on counting days is, for the sake of simplicity, a welcome
one. The computation is made in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a), which directs that
the day of the alleged transfer not be counted while the day the petition is filed is counted.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 401(a).
The limiting of the trustee's power of avoidance to those transfers that occur within a
certain period of time prior to the filing of the petition has been criticized as "reduc[ing] the
preference to a sporting proposition." Note, Preferential Transfers and the Value of the
Insolvent Firm, 87 YALE L.J. 1449, 1457 (1978) (quoting 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES AND PREFERENCES § 384 at 664 (1940)). The author points out the problems relating to
the race of diligence and the creditor's incentive to keep secret the debtor's insolvency and
the transfer "at a time when candor and cooperation are most needed." Id. at 1457. The
author proposes the replacement of the time-limit rules with an affirmative. defense for
transfers not directly related to the bankruptcy. Id. at 1459.
158. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B) (West 1979).
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arm's length with the debtor. 59 The trustee may avoid a transfer
to an insider during the period from one year to ninety days before
the filing of the petition if the insider "had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such trans-
fer. . . ."1o The resurrection of the requirement of a reasonable
belief of insolvency in this situation shows that Congress recog-
nized the commercial reality that informal lines of communication
of business information exist. An insider must be one who is in a
position to take advantage of these lines of communication. The
policy of discouraging the race of diligence is furthered by permit-
ting the avoidance of transfers within one year of the filing of the
petition. In this subsection, the requirement of a reasonable belief
of insolvency merely reflects the realistic assumption that "insid-
ers" likely will know of the debtor's financial situation earlier than
non-insiders will.
The "insider" definition and provisions, although new to the
federal bankruptcy scheme, are not unique. State preference stat-
utes made applicable in federal bankruptcies through the opera-
tion of section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act"'1 have given the trustee
the power to set aside a transfer to one deemed to have inside in-
formation concerning the debtor's financial condition, if the trans-
fer was made more than four months before the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy. In Florida, however, the enactment of the Code
provision has had the effect of closing a loophole for corporate
debtors. The current Florida General Corporation Act, which be-
came effective January 1, 1976,111 did not include the prior state
preference statute, which had prohibited transfers to insiders (of-
ficers, directors, and shareholders) after or in contemplation of in-
solvency.6 8 The legislature failed to pass any statute declaring
such preferential transfers invalid; this left creditors of a corporate
debtor without a remedy unless the transfer to an insider occurred
within four months of bankruptcy."6' The Code addresses this situ-
159. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 312; 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (West 1979). This list is
merely illustrative, not exclusive. See id. § 102(3).
160. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii).
161. See Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1) (superseded by 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 1979)).
162. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.001-.414 (1975).
163. Id. § 608.55 (repealed Fla. Laws ch. 75-250, § 139 (1975)).
164. FLA. STAT. § 607.144 (1979) (derived from id. § 608.55) merely holds a director of a
corporation liable to the corporation for voting or assenting to the distribution of corporate
assets contrary to the Corporation Act or the articles of incorporation, or for the value of
assets distributed to shareholders during the liquidation of the corporation to the prejudice
of the creditors of the corporation. It does not invalidate these preferential transfers. See
generally Ryder Truck Rental v. Missouri Beef Packers, Inc., 358 So. 2d 103 (1978).
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ation, providing a remedy for insider preferences made up to a
year prior to bankruptcy. Since most transfers of this type occur
within a year before bankruptcy, the Code provision adequately
protects the creditors from the insider.
The fifth and final element of a preference concerns the actual
effect of transfer. This element requires that as of the date of
bankruptcy the transfer enable the transferee creditor to receive
"more than such creditor would receive if-(A) the case were a
case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been
made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title.116 5 Thus, the test
has changed from an inquiry into whether the tranfer has enabled
a creditor to "obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class" could, to one which focuses the
court's attention on the evenness of distribution between the clas-
ses as well as the allowability of the underlying claim."'
The Code retains from the Act generally the same tests for
determining when a transfer is made and perfected. 1 7 A transfer
of realty is perfected, and therefore made, when it is valid as
against a bona fide purchaser.168 A transfer of personal property
and fixtures is perfected when "a creditor on a simple contract
cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the
transferee."' ' s A transfer is made when it occurs if perfected at
that time or within ten days thereafter. If the transfer is not per-
fected before the commencement of the case or within ten days
after it takes effect as between the transferor and transferee, then
it is deemed to have been made immediately prior to the filing of
the petition.1 7 0 Finally, for the purposes of this preference section,
165. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(5) (West 1979); see Palmer Clay Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227,
229 (1935) (whether a creditor has been preferred determined when bankruptcy results and
not at the time of the alleged preferential transfer).
166. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(5) (West 1979) with Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1) (re-
pealed 1978). A claim which is disallowed pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b) (West 1979) will
satisfy this element because the holder of such a claim would receive nothing in distribution.
167. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e) (West 1979) with Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2) (re-
pealed 1978).
168. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(1)(A) (West 1979); see Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2) (repealed
1978).
169. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(1)(B) (West 1979); see Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2) (repealed
1978). The term "simple contract" is derived from Bankruptcy Act § 60a(4) (repealed 1978).
170. 11 U.S.C.A. § 527(e)(2) (West 1979). The grace period which enables the relation
back of a perfection to the time of the transfer within 10 days of the extension of credit
precludes a finding of a transfer on account of an antecedent debt. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(7)
provided a 21-day grace period, which was inconsistent with the provisions of U.C.C. § 9-
301(2). This inconsistency gave rise to confusion as to how long a secured creditor had to
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no transfer can be deemed "made" until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred.
17 1
This last provision overrules the cases holding that a "trans-
fer" for the purposes of bankruptcy occurs at the time of an act by
which a secured creditor protects his priority status over later
creditors, rather than at the (later) time of the event perfecting the
security interest in a specific item of collateral.172 Thus, for a se-
curity interest in accounts receivable,173 a transfer is deemed to oc-
cur only when the debtor has rights in the accounts, which is when
the accounts come into existence. This will happen after the se-
cured party has filed a financing statement and thereby "so far
perfected [his security interest] that no subsequent lien upon such
property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee. ' ' 7
This change does not, however, fully impair the use of future ac-
counts receivable as collateral, for Congress has excepted from
preferential treatment such transfers to the extent the secured
party does not improve his position relative to other creditors
within the ninety days prior to the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy.
17 5
There are exceptions to the trustee's power of avoidance that
are designed to enable a debtor to continue its normal financial
relations. For example, to the extent that a debtor and creditor
intend the transfer to be a "contemporaneous exchange for new
value," and it is in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange,
the trustee may not avoid it.17 6 Also immune from attack as prefer-
ential is the debtor's payment of debts no later than forty-five days
after they were incurred in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of both debtor and creditor. 7 7 In addition, the
perfect his interest. See Clark, supra note 146, at 158 n.16, 165. The Code eliminates this
inconsistency.
171. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3) (West 1979).
172. E.g., In re Wilco Forest Mach. Inc., 491 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974); In re King-
Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 1971); Dubay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1969). See generally Mann & Phillips, Floating Liens as Preferential Transfers Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 85 CoM. L.J. 7, 10 (1980).
173. The term receivable is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right
has been earned by performance." 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a) (West 1979). The terms "inventory"
and "new value" are also defined in this section to avoid uncertainty as to their meaning. Id.
174. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2) (repealed 1978).
175. See notes 180-183 and accompanying text infra.
176. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(1) (West 1979); see Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443 (1917).
177. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West 1979). The use of the phrase "financial affairs of the
debtor" includes nonbusiness activities, such as monthly utility payments. HoUsE REPORT,
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transfer of a perfected purchase money security interest gives rise
to this same immunity to the extent that it secures new value. 17 8
The Code retains, with some modification, the provision enabling a
creditor who has been preferred to extend to the debtor new value
that, to the extent not secured, may be set off against the amount
of the voidable transfer.
179
Perhaps the most significant exception to the trustee's avoid-
ance power arises in favor of those creditors secured by floating
liens on inventory, accounts receivable, or the proceeds of either.180
The Code language is almost inscrutable, but its general meaning
is that a secured creditor with interests in such property may not
improve his position during the ninety-day period prior to bank-
ruptcy. 1 ' If he has not improved his position, then he has not been
preferred, but to the extent that the creditor has improved his po-
sition, he has been preferred. This determination depends on a
straightforward two-date test. First, the creditor's position on the
ninetieth day before the bankruptcy is examined to ascertain any
deficiency in the collateral necessary to satisfy the outstanding
loan. Then, on the date of bankruptcy, the creditor's position is
supra note 9, at 373.
There are several areas of potential litigation with respect to this exception. The most
litigious issues are likely to be whether the debt and payment have been made in the ordi-
nary course of each party's business; when a debt is "incurred"; when the debtor obtains a
property interest in the goods; and when a demand for payment has been made. 4 COLLIER,
supra note 3, at 547.38 (citing Countryman, Bankruptcy Preferences-Current Law and
Proposed Changes, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 95, 102 (1978)).
178. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(3) (West 1979). Compare id. § 547(c)(3)(B) with U.C.C. § 9-
301(2) (the grace period under the Code is measured from the time the security interest
attaches, while under the U.C.C. the secured party has ten days to perfect once the debtor
takes possession of the collateral). Note also the requirement of a written security agree-
ment for a so-called "enabling loan." See 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 547.39.
179. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(4) (West 1979) with Bankruptcy Act § 60c (repealed
1978). A shortcoming of the prior law as drafted was the requirement that the extension of
further credit be "without security of any kind." Id. Therefore, if a preferred creditor subse-
quently extended credit, partially secured, he would be unable to set off even that part of
the advance that was unsecured. Case law, however, did not give the Act such a literal read-
ing. The Code codifies the "net result" rule and thereby provides a more equitable result.
See In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 393 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 968) (looking to the value of
the security taken for new advances); Kohn, Preferential Transfers on the Eve of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments, 2 PRosEcUTroR 259, 273 (1968). Case law decided under the Bank-
ruptcy Act § 60c (repealed 1978) indicated that services rendered by a firm of attorneys and
accountants to the bankrupt constitute "property," the value of which could be set off
against the amount otherwise recovered as a preference. In re Ira Haupt & Co., 424 F.2d 722
(2d Cir. 1970). The Code takes no position on this issue.
180. 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(c)(5) (West 1979).
181. The period for insiders is one year prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) (West 1979).
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reexamined and, to the extent the deficiency has decreased, the
trustee may recover a preference. 182 Note that fluctuations in the
value of the collateral during the ninety days before bankruptcy do
not affect the existence of a preference. Although this rule may
lead to an inequitable result in certain cases, it is easy to
administer. 83
A final exception provides that to the extent a statutory lien is
valid under section 545 of the Code, it is immune from attack as a
preference.'84
The effect of an avoided transfer has been changed. A recov-
ered preference is, under the Code, automatically preserved for the
benefit of the estate.' 8' Before Congress enacted the Code, the
preservation of recovered preferences for the estate was not auto-
matic. The trustee had to move the court to preserve the prefer-
ence. The court would then have to hold a hearing on the mo-
tion."86 The Code requires a hearing on the fate of a recovered
preference only if the trustee wishes to abandon the property on
the ground that its preservation is not useful for the estate,
thereby removing the property once more from the estate. 87 When
the preservation of a recovered preference does not take place,
lienors whose liens on the recovered property are junior to a lien
avoided as a preference will receive a windfall. Their liens will be
promoted because of the absence of the avoided senior lien, yet the
property will not be subject to the claims of the unsecured credi-
tors, because it will not be part of the bankrupt's estate. The Code
eliminates this problem by providing for automatic preservation
unless the trustee abandons the property after a hearing.
The framers of the new Code have attempted to preserve the
policy of equitable distribution in grafting the new preference sec-
182. See Lavin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J.
173, 188-89 (1979).
11 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (West 1979) adopts a similar improvement in the position test
with respect to the trustee's right to avoid a prepetition setoff. He may do so to the extent
that an "insufficiency" ("the amount, if any, by which a claim against the debtor exceeds a
mutual debt owing to the debtor," id. § 553(b)(2)) on the date the setoff is exercised is less
than an insufficiency on the later date of either ninety days before bankruptcy or the first
date during the ninety days when there is an insufficiency. See generally Clark, supra note
146, at 166.
183. See Kohn, supra note 179, at 263-64.
184. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(6) (West 1979); id. § 545 (statutory liens).
185. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1979) with Bankruptcy Act § 67a(3) (repealed
1978).
186. Bankruptcy Act § 67a(3) (repealed 1978).
187. 11 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1979).
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tion onto the existing state of commercial reality. Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code permits a clause in a security agree-
ment giving the secured creditor a security interest in after-ac-
quired property of the debtor, such as inventory or accounts re-
ceivable. This clause has the effect of fully insulating the secured
creditor from a challenge by unsecured creditors. The uniformity
of the courts in upholding these "dragnet" clauses indicated a need
for the legislature to address the problem. The after-acquired
property clause often resulted in a double sting to an unsecured
creditor: he did not receive payment on the loan that was extended
shortly before bankruptcy, and he was liable for the return of pay-
ments made within four months of bankruptcy. Even when suc-
cessful in defending the case, the creditor was put to great expense
and harrassment. The new provisions on the avoidance of floating
liens bring about fairer results than those under the Act.
B. Leases and Executory Contracts
Modern bankruptcy law usually deals with the problems of the
commercial lease and executory contract. In a radical departure
from the law under the Act, the Code does so as well.
One of the main problems confronting the drafters of the Code
was the treatment of "boiler plate" bankruptcy clauses contained
in the typical commercial lease. The usual effect of these clauses is
that the insolvency of the lessee, or the filing of a petition for the
lessee's bankruptcy for the purpose of effecting either a liquidation
or a reorganization, constitutes a material breach of the lease. This
breach causes a forfeiture of the lessee's rights under the lease.
The Act had made such clauses expressly enforceable. 188 Federal
courts had long upheld the rights of landlords to declare a default
upon the insolvency of the debtor. 189 Lease draftsmen, encouraged
by federal appellate decisions, began to include language that
188. Bankruptcy Act § 70b (repealed 1978) provided in part:
Unless a lease of real property expressly otherwise provides, a rejection of the
lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor does not deprive the
lessee of his estate. A general covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be
assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same
at his election and subsequently assigning the same; but an express covenant
that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party
thereto or of either party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an
election to terminate the same is enforceable.
189. E.g., Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300 (1944). In this reorganization proceeding the
Court was reluctant to enforce an express covenant of forfeiture against the trustee, but it
did recognize its duty under the Act to do so. Id. at 303.
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
would enable the declaration of a breach upon the mere filing of a
petition for liquidation or reorganization. Eventually, however,
courts began to recognize that the subsequent forfeiture of a
debtor's leasehold more often than not resulted in a complete frus-
tration of rehabilitative efforts. Typically, in a reorganization the
lease is either a principal asset of the debtor or, by its terms, a
substantial liability. Reorganization proceedings often begin in
consideration of this potential asset or the discharge of this liabil-
ity. For a time, the courts attempted to circumvent defaults and
avoid forfeitures by carving out exceptions to the Act. They were
able to accomplish this end either by finding a waiver of the de-
fault in the subsequent acceptance of rent or through some other
device. 190 Recent courts have abandoned a waiver theory and have
simply refused to enforce boiler plate "bankruptcy clauses." The
policies behind these decisions are the desire to rehabilitate the
debtor, the need to provide for the equitable distribution of the
debtor's assets upon liquidation, and equity's general abhorrence
of a forfeiture. 191
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 has adopted these policy
considerations for both liquidation and reorganization proceedings.
The Code declares invalid any provision in an unexpired lease or
other executory contract that will operate to modify or terminate
the rights of the debtor and is conditioned upon the insolvency of
the debtor, the filing of a petition under the Code, or the appoint-
ment of a trustee after commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding
or of a custodian before bankruptcy.1 92 (An executory contract
under the Code is one in which both parties must render perform-
ance in the future.)198
190. E.g., Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1972); Speare v. Consolidated As-
sets Corp., 360 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1966).
191. See In re Fontainbleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975); Queens Blvd.
Wine & Liquor Corp., 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974). But cf. In re D.H. Overmeyer Co., 510
F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1975) (debtor's conduct did not justify a grant of equitable relief from the
operation of a forfeiture clause since he was consistently behind in rent payments, mortgage
payments and tax obligations and did not present a feasible plan of rehabilitation).
192. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(e) (West 1979).
193. The definition of an executory contract for the purposes of rejection or assumption
by the trustee is by no means clear. Professor Countryman proffers a definition of an execu-
tory contract within the bankruptcy context: "a contract under which the obligation of both
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the perform-
ance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
450, 460 (1972). This definition was applied in In re Knutson, 563 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977)
(airline tickets purchased by the bankrupt but not used held to be executory contracts re-
quiring assumption or rejection by the trustee).
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The Code, however, provides for an exception to this rule.
This exception applies to a party whom the applicable law does
not require to accept the performance of the trustee or to render
performance to the trustee. The scope of this exception includes
obligors under personal service contracts as well as obligors under
contracts to make a loan to the debtor.194 The exception operates
irrespective of restrictions on assignments of rights or delegations
of duties under the contract.195
The Code provides that in a liquidation proceeding, the trus-
tee must assume or reject the obligations of an unexpired lease or
other executory contract within sixty days after the entry of an
order for relief, unless the court for cause and within the sixty-day
period grants the trustee additional time within which to act. 19"
Failure of the trustee to assume the obligations contract within the
time limit results in the trustee's being deemed to have rejected
those obligations. The trustee would then be liable for breach of
the rejected contract.'"
The Code further provides that if there has been a default in
an executory contract, except for a technical breach relating to the
insolvency proceedings of the debtor, the trustee may not assume
the contract or lease unless he can provide adequate assurance of
cure and of future performance. In addition, the trustee must be
able to provide compensation for actual pecuniary loss arising out
of the default.198 The Code does not address the question of
whether the trustee must provide adequate assurances where the
bankrupt is not technically in default.199 But because the Act re-
quired the trustee to demonstrate an ability to perform before as-
sumption, even when the bankrupt was not in default, the courts
probably will impose this same requirement under the Code.00
The Code illustrates the operation of the requirement of adequate
194. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(e)(2) (West 1979).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 365(d)(1). This is to be distinguished from a case under the reorganization
provisions of the Code. These provisions enable the trustee to assume or reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease at any time prior to the confirmation of a plan, unless a party in
interest requests and the court orders a specified period of time within which the trustee
must act. Id. § 365(d)(2).
197. Id. § 365(d)(1).
198. Id. § 365(b)(1).
199. See Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Contracts and Leases in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, 25 PRAC. LAW., No. 7 at 11, 15 (1979).
200. Id.; cf. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(f)(2)(B) (West 1979) (adequate assurance of future per-
formance required of an assignee of an assumed contract whether or not there has been a
default).
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assurances by defining what are "adequate assurances" for the fu-
ture performance of a real property lease in a shopping center. 0 1 It
is assumed that in other contexts, the bankruptcy courts will look
to cases construing the Uniform Commercial Code for guidance as
to what constitutes "adequate assurances. "202
A compelling reason for the requirement of adequate assur-
ances of cure and performance as a prerequisite to the trustee's
assumption of executory agreements is that such an assumption
will result in increased administrative expenses for the estate. This
would cause a reduction in the assets available for distribution.2 0
For this reason, if a trustee assigns a contract after he assumes it,
the proposed assignee also must provide adequate assurances of fu-
ture performance. Moreover, any contract provision purporting to
modify or terminate rights under the contract because of such an
assignment is invalid.204 Furthermore, an assignment of a contract
extinguishes any liability of the estate from that contract.2 5
The Code also provides for the insolvency of the landlord. The
Code retains the old principle that the bankruptcy of the landlord
will not serve to deprive the tenant of his leasehold 06 If the trus-
tee rejects the unexpired lease, the lessee has an option. He may
remain in possession and offset against his rent any damage the
insolvent lessor's nonperformance has caused him, or he may treat
the lease as terminated.20 Similar provisions ensure that a party in
possession of realty under an executory contract for the'sale of
land may not lose the right of possession because of the trustee's
rejection of the contract °8 The purchaser in possession may either
treat the contract as terminated and have a lien for the amount of
the purchase price he has paid or remain in possession and con-
201. The trustee must provide adequate assurance of rent; that percentage rent due will
not decline substantially; that assumption or assignment of the lease will not breach provi-
sions relating to radius, location, use, exclusivity in the master agreement of the shopping
center; and that the tenant mix will not be disrupted. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(3) (West 1979).
202. See FLA. STAT. § 672.609(1) (1979).
203. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 365.01[1l.
204. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(f) (West 1979).
205. Id. § 365(k).
206. Id. § 365(h)(1). The Act provided that "[ulnless a lease of real property expressly
otherwise provides, a rejection of the lease or any covenant therein by the trustee of the
lessor does not deprive the lessee of his estate." Bankruptcy Act § 70b (repealed 1978). The
Code does not qualify the principle, and it is submitted that any language of the lease to the
contrary will not be controlling.
207. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h) (West 1979). The lessee is limited in damages solely to the
offset of rent and has no rights against the bankrupt's estate.
208. Id. § 365(i)(1).
[Vol. 34:403
BANKRUPTCY
tinue to make the payments due under the contract. 09 Should the
purchaser elect to continue in possession, he may "offset against
such payments any damages occurring after the date of the rejec-
tion . . . caused by the non-performance of any obligation of the
debtor .... ,'0 Offset is the exclusive remedy of the purchaser;
there is no right to recover damages from the estate. The trustee
accordingly will have no obligations under the contract except for
the delivery of title to the purchaser. "1
These substantial revisions of what was formerly section 70b
of the Act should result in a more successful rehabilitation or liqui-
dation for a debtor. The risks to a lessor from an insolvent lessee
will be limited to possible expectation losses. The Code may fore-
close both lessors and lessees from reaping a windfall due to infla-
tionary pressures in the economy and the prevailing appreciation
in land values. No one, however, will suffer unreasonable losses.
C. Exemptions
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 legislated sweeping re-
form in the area of exemptions. An exemption under the bank-
ruptcy statute excludes a person's property from the body of the
estate available to satisfy creditors. Congress continues to recog-
nize the states' interest in regulating credit. The Code nevertheless
contains a set of federal exemptions reflecting a national interest in
"seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out with
adequate possessions to begin his fresh start.""' A balance of these
interests has been struck. The Code does permit individual states
to preclude the debtor from taking advantage of the federal ex-
emptions under section 522(d) of the Code instead of whatever cor-
responding state exemptions exist.1 8 The Florida Legislature has
exercised its right of veto. Most of the federal exemptions are thus
not available to individual debtors domiciled within this state.2 14
Under the Code, notwithstanding the inapplicability of other
federal exemptions, a debtor in a vetoing state such as Florida may
exempt "any interest in property in which the debtor had, immedi-
209. Id. § 365(j).
210. Id. § 365(i)(2).
211. Id.
212. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 126.
213. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1) (West 1979) provides that an individual debtor may ex-
empt from the bankruptcy estate property within the federal exemptions under id. § 522(d)
"unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor ... specifically does not so authorize."
214. FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1979).
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ately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant
by the entirety . . . ," but only to the extent that the interest is
exempt from process under state law.215 Tenancies by the entirety
are exempt from process in Florida. 16 Florida debtors may there-
fore take advantage of this provision. The debtor therefore may
convert nonexempt property into exempt property on the eve of
bankruptcy, as he could under the Act. This practice is generally
held not to defraud the creditors.
2 1 7
Exempt property is not available for the satisfaction of most
debts that arose or were deemed to have arisen before the com-
mencement of the case. Certain claims, however, such as those for
taxes, alimony, and support, may look to exempt as well as nonex-
empt property.2 8 Furthermore, valid liens not subject to the trus-
tee's avoidance power or liens will be enforceable on exempt prop-
erty to the extent that they are granted secured status. 1"
Recognizing the plight of consumer debtors in bankruptcy, Con-
gress has given the debtor rights in exempt property that one may
hope will promote complete relief and make possible a genuine
fresh start. The debtor may avoid judicial liens on exempt prop-
erty. He may also avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money secur-
ity interests taken on certain household goods, tools of the trade,
and health aids prescribed for the debtor or his dependents.2 0 The
debtor is further protected in that any waiver of exemptions or of
the available avoiding powers is unenforceable."'
In a change from prior law, the debtor under the Code may
exempt property recovered by the trustee so long as that property
was not voluntarily transferred or concealed by the debtor.2"
215. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(B) (West 1979) (emphasis added). For examples of exemp-
tions under other federal laws available in conjunction with state exemptions, see HousE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 360.
216. See Liberman v. Kelso, 354 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
217. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 361; 3 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 522.08[4].
218. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c) (West 1979).
219. Id. § 522(c)(2).
220. Id. § 522(f). The proponents of the Code felt that a debtor should be entitled to
his exemptions even though "a creditor beats the debtor in court." HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 126. The power to avoid certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security inter-
ests results from recognition of the fact that the only inherent value of such security inter-
ests is the leverage they afford the creditor. Since the collateral usually has little value to
the secured party and yet is often vitally necessary to the debtor, creditors often threaten
repossession to compel payment of the debt. Id.
221. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(e) (West 1979).
222. Id. § 522(g); cf. Bankruptcy Act § 6 (repealed 1978) ("[N]o such allowance 'for
exempt property' shall be made out of property which a bankrupt transferred or concealed
and which is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Act for the benefit of
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Should the trustee fail to exercise the avoidance powers to recover
such property, the Code permits the debtor so to act.22 3
The procedure for claiming an exemption requires that the
debtor or a dependent file a list of all such property and state the
applicable exemptions. This property is then exempt unless a
party in interest objects. 2 4 The objecting party has the burden of
proof, and the issue shall be resolved in a summary matter by the
bankruptcy judge.2
V. CONCLUSION
Has the Code strengthened our legal system? The Code seems
to contain some improvements in the law mixed with some dis-
turbing developments. The debtor now has increased procedural
protections. The powerful remedy of the involuntary petition is
now more readily available to creditors. The bureaucratization of
the bankruptcy system, however, is an ominous sign. Congress ap-
parently lacks faith in its own law. The Chrysler "bail-out" illus-
trates this lack of faith. Many of the Code's procedural reforms are
designed to reduce the control of lawyers over the bankruptcy pro-
cess. This reformation is illogical in a field that requires years of
experience to master. Would Congress suggest that brain surgery
be performed by someone other than a trained neurosurgeon?
Why, then, does Congress trust this country's bankruptcy lawyers
so little?
the estate .... ").
223. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(h) (West 1979).
224. Id. § 522(t).
225. See id.
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